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Note 
 
Status Update: Adapting the Stored 
Communications Act to a Modern World 
Jake Vandelist*
The sheer number of electronic communications users is 
astounding. There were an estimated 2.9 billion email accounts 
in 2010, and this is expected to rise to 3.8 billion by 2014.
 
1 In 
2012, there were 950 million worldwide active users of Face-
book2 and over 500 million worldwide Twitter users.3 As a re-
sult of the increased number of email and social networking us-
ers, the amount of case law involving civil discovery has 
exploded. In the first six months of 2012, over three hundred 
published civil opinions substantively involved social media.4
 
*  J.D. Candidate 2014, University of Minnesota Law School; B.A. 2011, 
University of Wisconsin-Madison. Thank you to Professor Bradley Clary, for 
help in developing this topic; Ed Stockmeyer, Morgan Helme, and Grace Flem-
ing for their insightful edits and advice on this Note; Professor Kristin Hick-
man for her support of the journal throughout the year; and the board and 
staff of the Minnesota Law Review, for their help in editing this piece and for 
all of their hard work throughout the year on Volume 98. Many thanks also to 
my family and friends who have always provided me with unending support. 
Copyright © 2014 by Jake Vandelist. 
 
This number almost certainly understates the volume of cases 
 1. THE RADICATI GRP., INC., EMAIL STATISTICS REPORT, 2010, at 2 (Sara 
Radicati ed., 2010), available at http://www.radicati.com/wp/wp-content/ 
uploads/2010/04/Email-Statistics-Report-2010-2014-Executive-Summary2.pdf.  
 2. Associated Press, Number of Active Users at Facebook over the Years, 
YAHOO FINANCE (Oct. 23, 2012, 6:04 PM), http://finance.yahoo.com/news/ 
number-active-users-facebook-over-years-214600186--finance.html. 
 3. Twitter Reaches Half a Billion Accounts More than 140 Million in the 
U.S., SEMIOCAST, http://semiocast.com/publications/2012_07_30_Twitter_ 
reaches_half_a_billion_accounts_140m_in_the_US (last visited Feb. 4, 2014). 
 4. Published Cases: Involving Social Media Evidence (First Half 2012), 
X1 DISCOVERY, http://www.x1discovery.com/social_media_cases.html (last vis-
ited Mar. 10, 2014). These numbers were gleaned from searching “online legal 
databases of state and federal court decisions across the United States.” John 
Patzakis, Mid-Year Report: Legal Cases Involving Social Media Rapidly In-
creasing, X1 DISCOVERY (July 23, 2012, 3:20 PM), http://blog.x1discovery.com/ 
2012/07/23/mid-year-report-legal-cases-involving-social-media-rapidly 
-increasing/.  
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involving social media because only about one percent of all 
filed cases result in a published decision and many of the pub-
lished decisions involve fact patterns from as far back as 2008.5
The discovery of these electronic communications in civil 
litigation is governed by, among other things, the Stored Com-
munications Act of 1986 (SCA).
 
Accordingly, just as electronic communications have become an 
important part of everyday life, these communications have al-
so become essential to civil litigation.  
6 The current interpretation of 
the SCA prevents email and social networking websites from 
disclosing a user’s private messages in civil discovery.7 This ap-
proach limits the amount of available information in civil liti-
gation.8 As a result, some commentators have advocated for a 
civil discovery exception to the SCA, allowing email and social 
networking sites to fully disclose a user’s private messages in 
civil discovery.9 This approach is consistent with the liberal 
discovery approach taken by the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure.10 However, allowing broad discovery of electronic infor-
mation comes at a cost to both the court and to Internet service 
providers.11
 
 5. Patzakis, supra note 
 Therefore, in considering possible amendments to 
4. 
 6. See generally, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2712 (2006). 
 7. See, e.g., Theofel v. Farey-Jones, 359 F.3d 1066, 1075 (9th Cir. 2004) 
(holding the SCA prohibits civil discovery of any email from an email service 
provider).  
 8. See Ryan A. Ward, Note, Discovering Facebook: Social Network Sub-
poenas and the Stored Communications Act, 24 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 563, 564 
(2011) (explaining that users do not have access to all potentially relevant in-
formation regarding their social media accounts, however social media sites do 
have access to this information). 
 9. See, e.g., Rudolph J. Burshnic, Note, Applying the Stored Communica-
tions Act to the Civil Discovery of Social Networking Sites, 69 WASH. & LEE L. 
REV. 1259, 1289–93 (2012). 
 10. The Supreme Court has indicated that FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1), the 
general discovery provision of the federal rules, “has been construed broadly to 
encompass any matter that bears on, or that reasonably could lead to other 
matter that could bear on, any issue that is or may be in the case.” Oppenhei-
mer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 351 (1978) (emphasis added). Fur-
ther, since Oppenheimer was decided, the federal rules have been broadened to 
allow discovery regarding any matter “relevant to any party’s claim or de-
fense” instead of limiting discovery “relevant to the subject matter involved in 
the pending action.” Compare FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1), with Oppenheimer, 437 
U.S. at 350. 
 11. See generally, Patzakis, supra note 4 and accompanying text for the 
amount of cases involving social media content. Allowing third party subpoe-
nas in every single one of these cases would place a burden on these Internet 
service providers and the courts administering these requests. 
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the SCA legislators must be weigh the importance of broad dis-
covery against the efficiency of obtaining that information. 
This Note offers a solution to reconcile the competing val-
ues of efficiency and liberal discovery engendered by the SCA.12
I. THE STORED COMMUNICATIONS ACT’S APPLICATION 
TO MODERN CIVIL DISCOVERY  
 
Part I introduces the SCA and its application to private Inter-
net messages. Part II examines the different solutions for ad-
dressing the problems posed by the SCA in civil discovery. Fi-
nally, Part III recommends legislative reform to promote 
efficiency in the discovery of private Internet messages. Specifi-
cally, this Note proposes that Congress amend the SCA to pro-
vide a clearer and more flexible definition for what constitutes 
protected information and explicitly protect Internet service 
providers from being required to respond to third party sub-
poenas in civil suits, but allow such information to be acquired 
directly through the user. 
This Part sets out an overview of the SCA and its applica-
tion to civil discovery. First, this Part will introduce the SCA 
with a particular focus on the statutory provisions relevant to 
civil discovery. Next, it will briefly introduce the civil discovery 
provisions at issue and discuss the application of the SCA to 
email, social networking sites, and cloud computing services. 
Then, this Part outlines some judicially created alternatives to 
obtaining electronic communications in civil discovery. Finally, 
this Part sets out a framework from which to analyze discovery 
policy proposals. 
A. THE STORED COMMUNICATIONS ACT 
The SCA was enacted as Title II of the Electronic Commu-
nications Privacy Act (ECPA) of 1986.13
 
 12. Privacy concerns are present during the process of electronic discovery 
as well. This Note’s focus, however, is on the mechanisms of civil discovery and 
how they affect the information flow of litigation. Volumes have been written 
about user privacy as it relates to electronic discovery, for example, Rory Ba-
hadur, Electronic Discovery, Informational Privacy, Facebook and Utopian 
Civil Justice, 79 MISS. L.J. 317 (2009), which is outside the scope of this Note. 
 The purpose of the 
ECPA was to extend the codification of Fourth Amendment 
protections to the world of electronic communication and re-
 13. Pub. L. No. 99-508, §§ 201–202, 100 Stat. 1848, 1860–68 (1986) (codi-
fied as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2712 (2006)). 
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mote computing.14 Congress saw a potential gap in Fourth 
Amendment protection for information that would traditionally 
be protected but for it being sent or stored on the Internet or on 
a third party’s computers.15 Thus, in general, the SCA sought to 
both limit third party Internet service providers’ ability to dis-
close a user’s’ information voluntarily16 and limit the power of 
government investigators searching for electronic information.17
Congress drafted the SCA to reflect the technological land-
scape of 1986.
  
18 At this time, Internet users were primarily only 
able to send and receive electronic mail19 and upload comments 
to electronic bulletin boards.20 Further, some businesses con-
tracted out remote computing for data processing.21
 
 14. See H.R. REP. NO. 99-647, at 16–19 (1986) (describing the purpose of 
the ECPA as the codification of Fourth Amendment protections for emerging 
technologies like electronic messaging); S. REP. NO. 99-541, at 3 (1986), re-
printed in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3557 (identifying the potential lack of 
Fourth Amendment protections typically provided for personal and business 
information simply because that information is shared on computers). 
 According-
ly, only two types of Internet service providers are covered by 
the SCA: electronic communications service (ECS) providers 
 15. S. REP. NO. 99-541, at 3 (noting that if electronic information “is sub-
ject to control by a third party computer operator, the information may be sub-
ject to no constitutional privacy protection”). Generally, information sent with 
or stored on a third party Internet service provider is likely not covered by the 
Fourth Amendment. See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976) 
(“This Court has held repeatedly that the Fourth Amendment does not prohib-
it the obtaining of information revealed to a third party and conveyed by him 
to Government authorities . . . .”); Orin S. Kerr, A User’s Guide to the Stored 
Communications Act, and a Legislator’s Guide to Amending It, 72 GEO. WASH. 
L. REV. 1208, 1209–10 (2004) (indicating that because an Internet user’s com-
munications come into contact with other third party computers the Fourth 
Amendment does not protect such information). 
A thorough analysis of electronic communications and the Fourth 
Amendment is outside the scope of this Note. This sentence is merely provided 
to offer a glimpse into the intentions of the legislators behind the ECPA. 
 16. S. REP. NO. 99-541, at 3 (noting that one of the purposes of the ECPA 
was to prevent “wrongful use and public disclosure” of information stored elec-
tronically with third parties by “unauthorized private parties” indicating that 
Congress intended to extend privacy protection to the private sphere, beyond 
its traditional Fourth Amendment confines). 
 17. Ward, supra note 8, at 566. 
 18. William Jeremy Robison, Note, Free at What Cost?: Cloud Computing 
Privacy Under the Stored Communications Act, 98 GEO. L.J. 1195, 1204–05 
(2010) (arguing that instead of creating a flexible rule adaptable to changing 
technology, Congress froze the SCA in 1986). 
 19. S. REP. NO. 99-541, at 2 (1986). 
 20. H.R. REP. NO. 99-647, at 22 (1986). 
 21. Id. 
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and remote computing service (RCS) providers.22 Notably, the 
SCA does not cover individuals or service providers that do not 
qualify as ECS or RCS.23
An email provider is a typical example of an ECS.
 
24 An 
ECS is “any service which provides to users thereof the ability 
to send or receive wire or electronic communications.”25 Elec-
tronic communications include “any transfer of signs, signals, 
writing, images, sounds, data, or intelligence of any nature.”26 
Moreover, the only ECS communications protected by the SCA 
are those held in “electronic storage” by that service.27 Storage 
of electronic information can mean temporary or intermediate 
storage of an “electronic communication incidental” to its elec-
tronic transmission or storage of such communication for 
“backup protection.”28
An RCS is a provider “of computer storage or processing 
services by means of an electronic communications system.”
  
29 
An “electronic communications system” is facilities and equip-
ment used to transmit electronic communications.30 The RCS 
category was meant to include services that performed out-
sourced data processing.31
An ECS or RCS must offer its services to the public.
 
32 
Therefore, while a commercial email service like AOL would be 
considered offered to the public and therefore able to qualify as 
an ECS or RCS, an employer’s internal email service would 
not.33
 
 22. 18 U.S.C. § 2702(a) (2006). 
  
 23. See id.; 18 U.S.C. § 2707. 
 24. Kerr, supra note 15, at 1213; Ward, supra note 8, at 567. 
 25. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(15). 
 26. Id. § 2510(12). 
 27. Id. § 2702(a)(1). 
 28. Id. § 2510(17)(A)–(B).  
 29. Id. § 2711(2).  
 30. Id. § 2510(14).  
 31. See H.R. REP. NO. 99-647, at 19, 23 (1986) (explaining the technologies 
covered by the ECPA, including remote computing services); S. REP. NO. 99-
541, at 8, 10–11 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3562, 3564–65 
(describing the advent of remote computing services in order to fully define the 
statutory term). 
 32. See 18 U.S.C. § 2702(a)(1)–(3) (prohibiting ECS and RCS entities serv-
ing “the public” from disclosing any person’s communications to any person, 
entity, or government). 
 33. Kerr, supra note 15, at 1226. This distinction could exist because non-
public accounts benefit the providers more than the users or because public 
providers have less of an incentive to protect a user’s privacy rights, however, 
the legislative intent is unclear as to the distinction. See id. at 1226–27. Ac-
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If an Internet service provider qualifies as either an ECS 
or RCS, it may not disclose a user’s electronic communications 
absent a search warrant.34 Although the SCA creates some 
statutory exceptions to this rule, there are none that allow an 
ECS or RCS to disclose a user’s information during the course 
of civil discovery.35
However, the SCA only protects the “content” of a user’s 
electronic communications held by ECS and RCS providers.
 
36 
Content is defined by the statute as “any information concern-
ing the substance, purport, or meaning of that communica-
tion.”37 In contrast, non-content information is not protected by 
the SCA.38 As an illustration, the body of an email is protected 
by the SCA, whereas the name of the recipient and subject line 
are not.39
Congress did not contemplate how the SCA might apply to 
civil discovery. The statutory language of the SCA does not 
mention civil discovery.
  
40 Similarly, the legislative history of 
the ECPA is bereft of references to civil discovery.41
 
cordingly, the relevant portions of the SCA do not apply to nonpublic provid-
ers. 
 As a result, 
 34. 18 U.S.C. § 2702(a) (prohibiting ECS and RCS providers from volun-
tarily disclosing users’ information); 18 U.S.C. § 2702(b)–(d) (exempting cer-
tain communications from SCA protection); 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a)–(b) (providing 
certain exceptions for compelled disclosure of users’ information held by an 
ECS or RCS provider). 
 35. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2711. 
 36. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2702(a), 2703(a)–(b). 
 37. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(8). 
 38. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2702(a), 2703(a)–(b).  
 39. Kerr, supra note 15, at 1228; see H.R. REP. NO. 99-647, at 23 (1986) 
(clarifying that the records maintained by remote computing services have less 
protection than the contents of those communications). For a discussion on 
how traditional Fourth Amendment content and non-content protections apply 
to new technology, compare Achal Oza, Note, Amend the ECPA: The Fourth 
Amendment Protection Erodes as E-mails Get Dusty, 88 B.U. L. REV. 1043, 
1049–50 (2008), with David A. Couillard, Note, Defogging the Cloud: Applying 
Fourth Amendment Principles to Evolving Privacy Expectations in Cloud 
Computing, 93 MINN. L. REV. 2205, at 2229, 2233–39 (2009). 
 40. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–12. 
 41. See H.R. REP. NO. 99-647; S. REP. NO. 99-541 (1986), reprinted in 1986 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555; Electronic Communications Privacy Act: Hearing Before 
the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Admin. of Justice of the H. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong. 1 (1986); Electronic Communication Pri-
vacy: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Patents, Copyrights, and Trademarks, 
S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong. 1006 (1985); 1984: Civil Liberties and 
the National Security State: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil 
Liberties, and the Admin. of Justice, H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong. 1 
(1984); Oversight on Communications Privacy: Hearing Before the Subcomm. 
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courts are left with no guidance as to how the SCA applies to 
civil discovery. 
B. CIVIL DISCOVERY 
Before analyzing how courts have applied the SCA to civil 
electronic discovery disputes, it is important to introduce how 
these cases end up in court. Under the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, parties can file a Rule 45 subpoena to command a 
non-party to produce “documents, electronically stored infor-
mation, or tangible things.”42 These are commonly called sub-
poenas duces tecum.43 A subpoena duces tecum is the only tool 
litigants have to compel nonparties to produce documents in a 
civil case.44 The nonparty must produce the documents if they 
are in that party’s “possession, custody, or control.”45 The non-
party can object to the subpoena through a motion to quash or 
modify the subpoena.46
In a typical case where the SCA is implicated in civil dis-
covery, one of the litigants in a civil suit serves a subpoena 
duces tecum on a company that transmits electronic messages, 
such as Facebook.
 
47 Then either the nonparty, or the opposing 
party through an ex parte motion, files a motion to quash the 
subpoenas under, among other things, the SCA.48
C. APPLICATION OF THE SCA TO CIVIL DISCOVERY 
 The court 
then applies the SCA to Rule 45 and determines whether it 
bans discovery of the electronically stored information.  
Many courts have determined that the SCA bars civil dis-
covery of a user’s electronic communications from an ECS or 
 
on Patents, Copyrights, and Trademarks, S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th 
Cong. 1266 (1984); Surveillance, Part 2: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on 
Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Admin. of Justice, H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 
94th Cong. 1 (1975); Surveillance, Part 1: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on 
Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Admin. of Justice, H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 
94th Cong. 675 (1975). 
 42. FED. R. CIV. P. 45(a)(1)(A)(iii). 
 43. See 9A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCE-
DURE CIVIL § 2451 (3d ed. 2013). 
 44. Id. § 2456. 
 45. FED. R. CIV. P. 45(a)(1)(A)(iii). 
 46. See id. at 45(c)(3).  
 47. See, e.g., Crispin v. Christian Audigier, Inc., 717 F. Supp. 2d 965, 969 
(C.D. Cal. 2010). 
 48. See, e.g., id. at 969–70. 
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RCS.49 Most of these courts prohibit such discovery because 
there is no exception to the SCA allowing ECS or RCS provid-
ers to disclose a user’s information pursuant to a civil discovery 
request and because there is no congressional intent indicating 
otherwise.50 Therefore, courts are forced to classify Internet 
service providers within the ECS or RCS categories in order to 
determine whether the SCA prohibits civil discovery requests 
served directly upon Internet service providers. Due to the im-
mensity of technological change since 1986, it has been no easy 
task applying the SCA to current technology.51 Making this 
more complicated, some courts have held that a single service 
must be either an ECS or an RCS, but others have held that a 
single service can qualify as both an ECS and an RCS.52
The SCA traditionally has been interpreted to cover email 
providers. Courts have more recently applied the SCA to social 
networking sites. However, the new technology challenging the 
boundaries of SCA protection is cloud computing.  
 
1. Email Providers  
Courts agree that commercial email service providers, in 
general, are considered ECS providers under the SCA.53 Specif-
ically, it is generally understood that unopened emails are pro-
tected under the SCA.54 This is because the email communica-
tions are in “temporary, intermediate storage” incidental to 
their transmission.55
 
 49. See, e.g., Bower v. Bower, 808 F. Supp. 2d 348, 349–51 (D. Mass. 
2011); In re Subpoena Duces Tecum to AOL, LLC., 550 F. Supp. 2d 606, 611 
(E.D. Va. 2008); O’Grady v. Superior Court, 44 Cal. Rptr. 3d 72, 89 (Ct. App. 
2006); Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Netscape Commc’ns Corp., 196 F.R.D. 559, 561 
(N.D. Cal. 2000). 
 However, much disagreement exists over 
 50. See, e.g., Netscape, 196 F.R.D. at 561.  
 51. For example, in Crispin, the court labored over fifteen pages to deter-
mine the applicability of the ECS and RCS categories to email and social net-
working sites. 717 F. Supp. 2d at 976–91. 
 52. Compare Quon v. Arch Wireless Operating Co., 529 F.3d 892, 902–03 
(9th Cir. 2008) (holding that a service provider can only be either an ECS or 
an RCS), with Flagg v. City of Detroit, 252 F.R.D. 346, 362 (E.D. Mich. 2008) 
(holding that a service provider can be both an ECS and RCS). 
 53. See, e.g., Quon, 529 F.3d at 902–03 (9th Cir. 2008); United States v. 
Councilman, 418 F.3d 67, 79 (1st Cir. 2005); Theofel v. Farey-Jones, 359 F.3d 
1066, 1075 (9th Cir. 2004); Bower, 808 F. Supp. 2d at 349 (D. Mass. 2011). 
 54. See, e.g., Quon, 529 F.3d at 902–03; Theofel, 359 F.3d at 1077; United 
States v. Weaver, 636 F. Supp. 2d 769, 771 (C.D. Ill. 2009); Jennings v. Jen-
nings, 736 S.E.2d 242, 246 (S.C. 2012). 
 55. Theofel, 359 F.3d at 1075 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2510(17)(A)(2012)); ac-
cord Councilman, 418 F.3d at 72–79 (holding, after considering the text and 
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whether an opened email is considered to be in “electronic stor-
age” and thus protected from civil discovery by the SCA.56
Those arguing that opened emails should be considered to 
be held in backup storage indicate that emails left on a com-
mercial email provider’s servers, after a user downloads the 
message onto her computer, are left there for backup reasons.
  
57 
The principal rebuttal to this argument is that the backup pro-
vision definition of electronic storage should be narrowly inter-
preted as merely closing an “end-run” loophole around ECS 
protections without which Internet service providers could dis-
close unopened backup copies created incident to transmis-
sion.58 However, some of the courts that have held opened mes-
sages do not fit within the ECS category have suggested those 
same messages might constitute RCS content.59
2. Social Networking Sites 
  
Crispin v. Christian Audigier, Inc. was the first published 
case to apply the SCA to social media sites.60
 
legislative history of the ECPA, that unread emails were meant to be protect-
ed under the SCA). 
 The defendants 
 56. Compare, e.g., Theofel, 359 F.3d at 1077 (“[W]e think that prior access 
is irrelevant to whether the messages at issue were in electronic storage.”), 
and Cardinal Health 414, Inc. v. Adams, 582 F. Supp. 2d 967, 976 n.2 (M.D. 
Tenn. 2008) (holding that there is no difference between unopened and opened 
emails under the SCA), with Weaver, 636 F. Supp. 2d at 771 (noting that read 
emails have already been transmitted and are not stored for backup purposes, 
and are therefore unprotected), and Marc J. Zwillinger & Christian S. 
Genetski, Criminal Discovery of Internet Communications Under the Stored 
Communications Act: It’s Not a Level Playing Field, 97 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMI-
NOLOGY 569, 580 (2007) (“[T]he Theofel court’s analysis is somewhat tor-
tured.”). 
 57. See, e.g., Theofel, 359 F.3d at 1075 (“An obvious purpose for storing a 
message on an ISP’s server after delivery is to provide a second copy of the 
message . . . .”); cf. Quon, 529 F.3d at 902–03 (holding that a text message ser-
vice provider who permanently archived text messages on its servers was an 
ECS because these were archived for backup reasons).  
 58. Kerr, supra note 15, at 1217 n.61; cf. Jennings, 736 S.E.2d 242, 245 
(“We question the reasoning expressed in Theofel that such passive inaction 
can constitute storage for backup protection under the SCA . . . .”). 
 59. See, e.g., Weaver, 636 F. Supp. 2d at 772 (indicating that Hotmail was 
storing messages on a web-based email service “solely for the purpose of 
providing storage or computer processing services to such subscriber or cus-
tomer” (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2703(b)(2)(2012))); Jennings, 736 S.E.2d 242, 247 
n.3 (Toal, C.J., concurring) (noting that because an Internet service provider 
can act as both an ECS and RCS, it might be the case that an email stored on 
a web-based email system is protected under the RCS category). 
 60. 717 F. Supp. 2d 965, 977 (C.D. Cal. 2010) (“Although some courts have 
considered the SCA’s application to certain types of providers, none appears to 
Vandelist_MLR  
2014] STATUS UPDATE 1545 
 
served subpoenas duces tecum on Facebook and Myspace seek-
ing communications between the plaintiff and the defendant.61 
The plaintiff filed a motion to quash the subpoenas, arguing 
that the subpoenas were in violation of the SCA.62 The court 
first concluded that any private messaging on the social net-
working sites is protected from civil discovery under the ECS 
category, similar to emails.63 Further, the court analogized 
postings to a user’s Facebook wall or Myspace comments to the 
restricted electronic bulletin board systems which Congress in-
tended to protect under the SCA.64 Therefore, it held that this 
content renders Facebook and Myspace ECS providers, at least 
to the extent that a Facebook or Myspace user restricts access 
to his or her profile.65 In the alternative, the court held that this 
content could also be considered an RCS service because the 
communications were placed on the sites for storage purposes.66 
However, by implication, any Facebook wall postings or 
Myspace comments generally available to the public would not 
be protected by the SCA.67
Similarly, Viacom International Inc. v. Youtube Inc. held 
that an online service provider, YouTube, could not disclose a 
user’s private videos uploaded to the site in the course of civil 
discovery because such information was protected under the 
RCS designation of the SCA.
 
68 Without elaboration the court 
indicated that YouTube qualified as an RCS because it provid-
ed “remote computing service to the public.”69
3. Cloud Computing 
  
There are no published cases available involving the SCA’s 
application to cloud computing within the realm of civil discov-
ery. However, the entire field of computer processing is starting 
to shift to cloud computing.70
 
have addressed whether social-networking sites fall within the ambit of the 
statute.”). 
 Therefore, once again, courts will 
 61. Id. at 968–69. 
 62. Id. at 969. 
 63. Id. at 980. 
 64. Id. at 981–89. 
 65. Id.  
 66. Id. at 990. 
 67. See id. at 991. 
 68. 253 F.R.D. 256, 264 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).  
 69. Id. 
 70. See Robison, supra note 18, at 1199–1200 (describing “the era of cloud 
computing”). 
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have to apply the ECS and RCS definitions to new technology. 
Some suggest that cloud technology providers will not qualify 
as ECS because “many of today’s popular cloud computing ser-
vices are designed for purposes other than communication, 
such as word processing.”71
Some also suggest that cloud providers do not qualify as 
RCS providers because many providers make revenue through 
“contextual advertising.”
  
72 This means the service providers re-
lease customer’ information to third-party advertising compa-
nies in order to facilitate tailored advertising.73 It is possible 
this violates the RCS requirement that “‘storage or computer 
processing’ be the sole reason that a customer transmits her 
data to the cloud provider.”74
Current case law prohibits Internet service providers from 
disclosing a user’s private communications in the course of civil 
discovery due to the SCA. However, as use of social media be-
comes more integrated in our daily lives, the SCA’s application 
to civil discovery will become increasingly important. 
 
D. ALTERNATIVES TO THE SCA IN CIVIL DISCOVERY 
Serving a subpoena on a third party Internet service pro-
vider is not the only way electronic information can be discov-
ered in civil cases. Some courts have elected to ignore the SCA 
completely. And other courts have required parties to serve dis-
covery requests on the user instead of on the service provider. 
1. Ignore the SCA 
There are at least two cases in which courts have ignored 
the SCA’s application to civil discovery and allowed civil dis-
covery subpoenas to be served directly upon Facebook and 
Myspace.75 Commentators have criticized these opinions for 
rendering decisions in discord with federal law.76
 
 71. Id. at 1209. 
  
 72. Id. at 1213–14. 
 73. Id.  
 74. Id. at 1214. But see ECPA Reform and the Revolution in Cloud Com-
puting: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution, Civil Rights, and 
Civil Liberties, H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 144–45 (2010) (state-
ment of Microsoft Corporation) (indicating that it views any cloud technologies 
that allow for collaboration or interaction between users as ECS, and any time 
the purpose of a program is to provide access to an application or remote stor-
age of content it considers that program as an RCS). 
 75. See Ledbetter v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 06-cv-01958-WYD-MJW, 
2009 WL 1067018 (D. Colo. Apr. 21, 2009); Romano v. Steelcase Inc., 907 
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In Ledbetter v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., the court allowed a 
subpoena to be served by the defendant upon Facebook, 
Myspace, and Meetup.com for any relevant communications by 
the plaintiff.77 Even though the application of the SCA was de-
bated in the parties’ briefs,78 in a two-page opinion, the court 
did not address the SCA at all and merely concluded that the 
information “is reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of 
admissible evidence.”79
Similarly, in Romano v. Steelcase Inc., the court granted 
the defendant’s subpoena upon Facebook and Myspace seeking 
access to the plaintiff’s accounts and deleted information.
 
80 At 
the outset of the opinion the court noted that it had considered 
the SCA’s application to the discovery requests at issue.81 How-
ever, that is the only mention of the SCA throughout the entire 
opinion.82 In granting the subpoenas, the court only substan-
tively considered whether New York’s civil discovery rules 
permitted the broad scope of discovery and whether the plain-
tiff had Fourth Amendment protection of her social media 
posts.83
2. Serve Discovery Request upon the User, not the Provider 
 
As noted above, the SCA does not apply to individuals.84 
Therefore individuals can disclose any information traditionally 
covered by the SCA.85
 
N.Y.S.2d 650 (Sup. Ct. 2010). 
 Many courts have taken advantage of 
this exception to SCA protection and required the user of the 
Internet service provider to produce information instead of di-
 76. See, e.g., Ward, supra note 8, at 577. 
 77. Ledbetter, 2009 WL1067018, at *2. 
 78. Defendant Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.’s Motion to Compel Production of 
Content of Social Networking Sites, Ledbetter, 2009 WL 1067018, 2009 
WL3061763, at *4–5; Plaintiffs’ Response in Opposition to Defendant Wal-
Mart’s Motion to Compel Production of Content of Social Networking Sites, 
Ledbetter, 2009 WL 1067018, 2009 WL 3061764 at *9; Wal-Mart’s Reply in 
Support of Its Motion to Compel Production of Content of Social Networking 
Sites, Ledbetter, 2009 WL 1067018, 2009 WL 3061765, at *2. 
 79. Ledbetter, 2009 WL 1067018, at *2. 
 80. Romano, 907 N.Y.S.2d at 657. 
 81. Id. at 652. 
 82. See id. passim. 
 83. See id. at 652–57. 
 84. See supra text accompanying note 23. 
 85. See, e.g., Wesley Coll. v. Pitts, 974 F. Supp. 375, 389 (D. Del. 1997) 
(“[A] person who does not provide an electronic communication service . . . can 
disclose or use with impunity the contents of an electronic communication un-
lawfully obtained from electronic storage.”). 
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recting subpoenas upon the service providers.86 Most of these 
courts recognize that the SCA most likely prohibits any re-
quests directly on the Internet service providers and explicitly 
recognize they are bypassing these restrictions.87
E. COMPETING VALUES: EFFICIENCY AND LIBERAL DISCOVERY 
  
Before identifying and analyzing the proposed modifica-
tions to the SCA, it is necessary to consider the policy choices at 
stake. Any change in discovery rules implicates the competing 
values of efficiency and liberal discovery.88 Liberal discovery 
does not mean complete and errorless discovery, as this is im-
possible.89 Additionally, it is a waste of social resources, both in 
terms of economics and time, to attempt to discover and ana-
lyze every shred of evidence that might be relevant to a particu-
lar case.90
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure reflect this reality in 
the very first rule, identifying that all of the rules should be in-
terpreted in order to “secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive 
determination of every action and proceeding.”
  
91
 
 86. See, e.g., Glazer v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 2012 WL 1197167, at *3 
(S.D.N.Y. April 5, 2012); In re Air Crash near Clarence Center, New York, on 
February 12, 2009, 2011 WL 6370189, at *6 (W.D.N.Y. Dec. 20, 2011); EEOC 
v. Simply Storage Mgmt. Servs., 270 F.R.D. 430, 434 (S.D. Ind. 2010); Flagg v. 
City of Detroit, 252 F.R.D. 346, 359 (E.D. Mich. 2008); Mackelprang v. Fidelity 
Nat’l Title Agency of Nev., No. 2:06-CV-00788-JCM-GWF, 2007 WL 119149, at 
*6 (D. Nev. Jan. 9, 2007); Largent v. Reed, No. 2009-1823, 2011 WL 5632688, 
at *6–7 (Pa. Ct. C.P. Nov. 8, 2011). But cf. J.T. Shannon Lumber Co. v. Gilco 
Lumber Inc., 2008 WL 4755370, at *1 (N.D. Miss. Oct. 29, 2008) (holding that 
allowing a court to compel a defendant to consent to release information pro-
tected by the SCA would be an “end run around the [SCA],” though hinting 
that the plaintiff could serve a discovery request directly on the defendant to 
obtain the protected information). 
 Similarly, the 
 87. See, e.g., Glazer, 2012 WL 1197167, at *3 (requiring the plaintiff to 
produce electronically stored information in order to bypass SCA issues); 
Mackelprang, 2007 WL 119149, at *8 (“The proper method for obtaining such 
information, however, is to serve upon Plaintiff limited requests for production 
of relevant [Myspace] communications.”). 
 88. Compare Richard L. Marcus, Discovery Containment Redux, 39 B.C. L. 
REV. 747, 749 (1998) (lauding the benefits of broad discovery measures), with 
James S. Kakalik et al., Just, Speedy, and Inexpensive? An Evaluation of Ju-
dicial Case Management Under the Civil Justice Reform Act, 49 ALA. L. REV. 
17, 17 (1997) (identifying the perils of inefficient discovery).  
 89. See Robert G. Bone, Improving Rule 1: A Master Rule for the Federal 
Rules, 87 DENV. U. L. REV. 287, 302 (2010) (stating that in discovery “perfect 
accuracy is impossible”).  
 90. Id. 
 91. FED. R. CIV. P. 1. 
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rules explicitly reject complete and errorless discovery for elec-
tronic information, providing that parties do not have to pro-
duce electronic information that would result in “undue burden 
or cost.”92 Therefore, the policy battle between liberal discovery 
and efficiency is not waged at the extremes. Rather, the ongo-
ing argument is within the bounds of the current rules and how 
broadly or narrowly the discovery provisions should be inter-
preted.93
Those arguing for a broad interpretation of the federal dis-
covery provisions prioritize “just” over “speedy” and “inexpen-
sive” in rule one.
 
94 These scholars point to the benefits liberal 
discovery has provided to the justice system since its introduc-
tion in 1938.95 For example, some argue that liberal discovery 
rules have expanded substantive law in areas where it is often 
hard to prove claims, such as disparate treatment cases.96 
Moreover, broad discovery is an important procedural mecha-
nism available because it informs all parties of the merits of 
controversies and therefore allows for the “administration of 
justice.”97
In contrast, those arguing for efficient discovery emphasize 
that “just” outcomes are only available if litigation is “speedy” 
and “inexpensive.”
 
98
 
 92. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(B). 
 Congress endorsed this position when it 
enacted the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, which was rooted 
in the concern that civil litigants were denied access to justice 
due to inefficiencies and delay of the courts as a result of the 
 93. See Bone, supra note 89, at 300 (explaining that judges have broad 
discretion to interpret Fed. R. Civ. P. 1 as a broadening or narrowing provision 
of the rest of the Federal Rules). 
 94. Cf. id. at 293–95 (noting that pre-1970’s judges applied rule one to “to 
support liberal interpretations of the discovery rules”). 
 95. See, e.g., Stephen N. Subrin, Fishing Expeditions Allowed: The Histor-
ical Background of the 1938 Federal Discovery Rules, 39 B.C. L. REV. 691, 697 
(1998) (holding that liberal discovery has largely eliminated situations where 
“the merits of controversies are imperfectly understood by the parties, are in-
adequately presented to the courts, and too often fail to exert a controlling in-
fluence upon the final judgment”). 
 96. Marcus, supra note 88, at 749–52. 
 97. Subrin, supra note 95, at 697; see also Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Discov-
ery Vices and Trans-Substantive Virtues in the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 2237, 2239 (1989) (“[B]road access to document repos-
itories is the most powerful weapon in the Rules discovery armory . . . .”). 
 98. E.g., Bone, supra note 89, at 299 (“Sometimes . . . judges emphasize 
Rule 1’s reference to ‘speedy’ and ‘inexpensive,’ but sometimes they focus on 
achieving ‘just’ determinations, arguing that a party’s fear of excessive cost 
and delay can impede court access and produce unjust outcomes.”). 
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Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.99 These scholars argue the in-
troduction of mass quantities of electronically stored infor-
mation has furthered the need to focus on efficiency because 
parties “cannot reasonably expect to obtain all electronically 
stored information” through discovery when there are terabytes 
of possibly relevant information available.100
 
  
*  *  * 
 
The current interpretation of the SCA in civil discovery is 
an outmoded application of an outdated law. It does not correct-
ly balance the values of efficiency and liberal discovery. In 
recognition of its failures, many commentators have proposed 
modifications to the SCA. 
II. PROPOSED MODIFICATIONS TO THE SCA  
Due to the anachronistic ECS and RCS definitions, the in-
consistency of SCA application, and general uncertainty that 
the SCA has engendered in civil discovery, there have been 
many proposed modifications to the current application of the 
SCA. Each of these modifications should be analyzed to deter-
mine whether they strike the correct balance between efficiency 
and justice. The first proposed modification would have courts 
apply the Federal Rules of Civil Discovery and then correctly 
apply the SCA. The second proposed modification would simpli-
fy ECS and RCS categories. Finally, a proposed civil discovery 
exception would eviscerate SCA protection for civil litigants. 
None of these approaches strikes the right balance between ef-
ficiency and justice. 
A. RETAIN THE STATUS QUO 
One proposed modification to the SCA is not a modification 
at all, but merely a continuance of the status quo.101
 
 99. Kakalik et al., supra note 
 Under this 
approach, courts should first apply the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure to screen civil discovery subpoenas seeking infor-
88, at 17. 
 100. See Mia Mazza et al., In Pursuit of FRCP 1: Creative Approaches to 
Cutting and Shifting the Costs of Discovery of Electronically Stored Infor-
mation, 13 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 11, 85 (2007) (“The days when the requesting 
party can expect to ‘get it all’ and the producing party to produce whatever 
they feel like producing are long gone.” (quoting Hopson v. Mayor & City 
Council of Balt., 232 F.R.D. 228, 245 (D. Md. 2005))). 
 101. See Ward, supra note 8, at 581–88. 
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mation from Internet service providers for overbreadth and 
admissibility.102 Then, courts should apply the SCA to deter-
mine whether the service providers qualify for ECS or RCS pro-
tection.103
The status quo approach does not satisfy the “just” re-
quirement of rule one for two reasons. First, the current ap-
proach does not allow for full and complete discovery of infor-
mation stored online because the SCA protects any information 
that qualifies as ECS or RCS from civil discovery with no ex-
ception.
 This modification is both unjust and inefficient with-
in the meaning of rule one. 
104 Although some of this information is available 
through the user,105 users can only supply screenshots of their 
content, which are not searchable by the requesting party, and 
users often do not have access to their deleted data.106 Thus, 
there is a portion of information that is wholly undiscoverable 
in civil litigation regardless of its importance to the claims or 
defenses at issue. As a result, the status quo could create a sit-
uation where the merits of a controversy would be “imperfectly 
understood” and “inadequately presented to the court[].”107 This 
is the precise situation rule one’s “just” requirement and Rule 
twenty-six’s liberal discovery provisions were designed to 
avoid.108
Second, one of the foundations of the American legal sys-
tem is consistent adjudication for similarly situated parties.
  
109
 
 102. Id. at 582–84. Under the rules, a discovery request must be “relevant 
to any party’s claim or defense” and must be “reasonably calculated to lead to 
the discovery of admissible evidence.” FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1).  
 
 103. Ward, supra note 8, at 584–88. 
 104. See supra notes 34–35 and accompanying text. 
 105. See supra Part I.C.2. 
 106. See Ward, supra note 8, at 564.  
 107. Subrin, supra note 95, at 697. 
 108. See supra notes 94–97 and accompanying text.  
 109. William O. Douglas, Stare Decisis, 49 COLUM. L. REV. 735, 736 (1949) 
(“[T]here will be no equal justice under law if a negligence rule is applied in 
the morning but not in the afternoon.”); Christopher J. Peters, Foolish Con-
sistency: On Equality, Integrity, and Justice in Stare Decisis, 105 YALE L.J. 
2031, 2039 (1996) (“Such justifications of stare decisis include the notions that 
the rule allows for advantageous predictability in the ordering of private con-
duct, that it promotes the necessary perception that law is stable and relative-
ly unchanging, that it prevents frustration of private expectations, that it 
serves the resource-saving goal of judicial efficiency, and even that it preserves 
the separation of powers by enforcing judicial restraint.”); Justice Antonin 
Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1178 
(1989) ( “[O]ne of the most substantial . . . competing values [in adjudication], 
which often contradicts the search for perfection, is the appearance of equal 
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This foundation is upheld through liberal discovery rules that 
reduce the uncertainty of judicial outcomes.110 However, the 
current judicial interpretation of the SCA applies its protection 
inconsistently across similarly situated parties when they are 
seeking to discover email communications, and some courts 
even refuse to apply its protections at all.111
Additionally, the current application of the SCA is ineffi-
cient for two reasons, both of which result from out of date ECS 
and RCS definitions.
 Consistent adjudi-
cation is not ensured through consistent liberal discovery in a 
system that inconsistently admits electronically stored infor-
mation.  
112 First, judges have to jump through ana-
lytical hoops to apply the anachronistic ECS and RCS defini-
tions to current technology.113 Judicial wrangling with the 
SCA’s definitions in civil discovery diverts the attention of 
judges from deciding on the merits of the cases before them to 
applying obsolete definitions to new technology in order to de-
termine whether a piece of information is to be protected from 
civil discovery. This unnecessarily delays the adjudication of 
cases because judges are forced to rule on these protective or-
ders before even considering the merits of the case.114
 
treatment. As a motivating force of the human spirit, that value cannot be 
overestimated.”). 
  
 110. See Subrin, supra note 95, at 697 (“[A] large part of the uncertainty in 
the outcome [of trials] result[s] from the want of information on the part of lit-
igants and their counsel as to the real nature of the respective claims and the 
facts upon which they rest” (quoting Edson Sunderland, Foreword to GEORGE 
RAGLAND JR., DISCOVERY BEFORE TRIAL iii (1932))). 
 111. See supra Parts I.B, I.C.1. 
 112. ECPA Reform and the Revolution in Cloud Computing: Hearing Before 
the Subcomm. on the Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties, H. Comm. 
on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 21, 139–40 (2010) (statement of Richard Salga-
do, Law Enforcement and Security Counsel, Google Inc.) (arguing that the 
ECPA is out of date and has thus resulted in much confusion as to what is pro-
tected and what is not and noting that Gmail is at times an ECS, at times an 
RCS, but as for everything else was “largely unanticipated in 1986 when 
ECPA was passed, and determining whether a particular piece of information 
held by Google for any one of those services is held as an ECS or RCS is no 
trivial task”); id. at 143 (Response to post hearing questions from Mike Hintze, 
Assoc. Gen. Counsel, Microsoft Corporation) (“Technology has changed drasti-
cally since ECPA was enacted in 1986. It was not possible at that time to con-
template the manner and extent of the changes that have occurred in the 24 
years since the ECS and RCS definitions were drafted. Technological changes, 
coupled with the rather ambiguous definitions, create significant challenges 
for online service providers in determining the appropriate classification for 
their services.”). 
 113. See supra note 51 and accompanying text. 
 114. E.g., In re Subpoena Duces Tecum to AOL, LLC., 550 F. Supp. 2d 606, 
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Second, the uncertainty surrounding the SCA’s application 
to civil discovery has diverted social resources away from ser-
vice providers’ income-producing lines of business to the legal 
departments. While not necessarily inefficient within the 
meaning of rule one, it misallocates economic resources. This 
diversion takes place because service providers are unsure as to 
what they can disclose and what they must protect, especially 
with new technologies like cloud computing.115 The diversion of 
resources also occurs when judges grant third party subpoenas 
to obtain a user’s information from Internet service providers.116
The advocates of this approach alleged that it is a “uniform 
approach to discovery requests” for electronically stored infor-
mation.
  
117 Also, these proponents argue that applying the rules 
first will quash many third party subpoenas before the SCA is-
sues are even considered.118
 
611 (E.D. Va. 2008). 
 As noted above, many of the cur-
rent problems with the SCA’s application to civil discovery are 
a result of the inconsistent and complicated application to new 
technology; thus, a uniform approach to discovery requests of 
electronically stored information is something to strive for. 
However, both of these alleged benefits avoid the root problems 
of the SCA. It does not take into account the reduction of avail-
able information in discovery or the inefficiencies it engenders 
in the judicial process and the overall economy. Therefore, a 
more holistic solution should strive for uniformity of applica-
tion to electronic civil discovery requests, like this proposed so-
lution, but it must also attempt to eradicate the underlying is-
sues with the SCA. 
 115. E.g., ECPA Reform and the Revolution in Cloud Computing: Hearing 
Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties, H. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 21, 139–40 (2010) (Response to post 
hearing questions from Richard Salgado, Law Enforcement and Security 
Counsel, Google Inc.) (arguing that Gmail can be both an ECS and an RCS at 
different times, but most current technology could not have been anticipated 
by the 1986 ECPA); id. at 143–45 (Response to post hearing questions from 
Mike Hintze, Assoc. Gen. Counsel, Microsoft Corporation) (describing the 
complicated, confusing, and laborious process for determining whether tech-
nologies like geolocation, social networking, and online calendars qualify for 
ECS or RCS protection).  
 116. Cf. Kakalik et al., supra note 88, at 30 (explaining the costs of early 
case management). 
 117. Ward, supra note 8, at 581. 
 118. See id. at 582–84. 
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B. COLLAPSE THE ECS AND RCS DISTINCTION 
In order to remedy the inconsistencies that result from the 
archaic ECS and RCS definitions, some suggest collapsing the 
two categories into one.119 This remedy would eliminate the dis-
tinction between service providers and instead shift the focus to 
whether individual files are protected.120 Under this reform, the 
SCA would apply to all “network service providers” but keep 
the ECS and RCS distinction for files in order to preserve the 
differing legal standards for criminal investigations.121 One 
commentator further suggests that social networking sites 
should be explicitly included in the definition of “network ser-
vice provider” in accordance with the Crispin decision.122
This modification to the SCA makes important strides to-
wards justice and efficiency in the discovery of information 
stored online. Providing a more general and flexible definition 
for Internet service providers will simplify the statute and re-
duce confusion as to which providers are covered under the cur-
rent ECS and RCS definitions.
 
123 This broad definition is im-
portant going forward because it is flexible enough to cover a 
broad range of developing technologies, such as cloud compu-
ting.124 Providing clarity of coverage to courts will increase effi-
ciency during the discovery process125 and also produce more 
consistent protections across media platforms.126
However, this remedy is no panacea. It still retains the 
outdated ECS and RCS definitions for civil discovery purposes, 
merely shifting the focus from service providers to files.
 
127
 
 119. See Kerr, supra note 
 As 
stated above, retaining these definitions, in general, would re-
15, at 1235; Burshnic, supra note 9, at 1288–89. 
 120. Kerr, supra note 15, at 1235; Burshnic, supra note 9, at 1288–89. 
 121. Kerr, supra note 15, at 1235; Burshnic, supra note 9, at 1288–89. For 
an explanation of how the ECPA applies to criminal investigations, see gener-
ally Kerr, supra note 15, at 1218–33. 
 122. Burshnic, supra note 9, at 1288; see also supra text accompanying 
notes 60–67. 
 123. See Kerr, supra note 15, at 1235; Burshnic, supra note 9, at 1288–89. 
 124. For an explanation of the problems the ECS and RCS categories pose 
for cloud providers, see Part I.B.3. 
 125. See Burshnic, supra note 9, at 1288 (“It would also promote judicial 
economy; courts, like the one in Crispin, would no longer have to unnecessari-
ly labor over the ECS/RCS distinction.”). 
 126. See Kerr, supra note 15, at 1233 (explaining that the Ninth Circuit’s 
interpretation of the ECS and RCS categories is in conflict with the traditional 
understanding of the two categories and that simplification of the definition is 
necessary to remedy this conflict). 
 127. See Burshnic, supra note 9, at 1288–89. 
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sult in unjust outcomes due to the limitations on liberal discov-
ery and inconsistent outcomes and would increase judicial and 
economic inefficiencies.128
Moreover, adding social networking sites to the definition 
of a “network service provider” would repeat the same mistakes 
of the current ECPA, namely that it would codify privacy pro-
tections based on the technological landscape of today instead 
of drafting a broad and flexible rule to apply to present and fu-
ture technology.
 Therefore, it does not effectively re-
form the confusion that the definitions engender.  
129 Some might say that this argument could at-
tach to any legislation regulating technology; in other words, 
any legislation written today could be rendered outdated by de-
velopments in technology.130
C. PROVIDE A CIVIL DISCOVERY EXCEPTION  
 While it is true that any law writ-
ten today is hampered by our present assumptions regarding 
technology, the more narrow the definition as to what is pro-
tected by the SCA, the more likely it is to become outdated. For 
example, if Internet users stopped using social networking 
sites, just like users stopped using electronic bulletin boards, 
this part of the definition would be rendered obsolete. But if the 
definition included all Internet service providers, the definition 
would only be rendered obsolete if people stopped using the In-
ternet. Thus, while this remedy makes significant strides, it 
falls short of breaking through the shackles of the 1986 ECS 
and RCS definitions. 
A more holistic change to the SCA would be to add a civil 
discovery exception thereby permitting subpoenas to be served 
directly upon Internet service providers.131 Under this ap-
proach, proposed by Professors Zwillinger and Genetski, a civil 
litigant could petition the court to disclose the information pro-
tected by the SCA by showing it is relevant and unavailable 
from other sources.132
 
 128. See supra notes 
 If the request is granted, the court would 
give the service provider notice and an opportunity to “quash or 
104–16 and accompanying text. 
 129. For an explanation of the technological landscape of 1986, see supra 
notes 18–21 and accompanying text. 
 130. See, e.g., Lyria Bennett Moses, Recurring Dilemmas: The Law’s Race 
to Keep up with Technological Change, 2007 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 239, 
275 (2007) (describing that “future-proofing” technology is difficult because 
“the path of technological change is clouded in mystery”). 
 131. See Zwillinger & Genetski, supra note 56, at 597–98; Burshnic, supra 
note 9, at 1289–92. 
 132. Zwillinger & Genetski, supra note 56, at 597. 
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modify” the order if the information sought “would cause an 
undue burden on such provider.”133 If the order is granted, the 
service provider is entitled to cost reimbursement incurred 
through the production from the requesting party.134
This approach provides for more liberal discovery and 
therefore satisfies the interests of justice in rule one. It allows 
civil litigants the opportunity to discover all relevant electronic 
information by lifting the veil of SCA protection. For instance, 
if a user did not have access to relevant information because 
the user deleted it or deactivated her account, this procedural 
amendment would allow such information to be discovered 
from the service provider. In some lawsuits, such information 
could be essential to merits of the controversy and to the “ad-
ministration of justice.”
 
135
This proposal, however, fails to remedy the ECS and RCS 
definitions and therefore will result in inconsistent application 
of the cost-shifting burden explained above.
  
136 The question of 
whether electronically stored information is covered by these 
proposed procedures is still subject to the outdated ECS and 
RCS definitions that create unjustly inconsistent outcomes and 
judicial and economic inefficiency.137
Still, as a general matter this modification strikes a rea-
sonable balance between justice and efficiency because of its 
cost-shifting mechanism. Typically, the responding party pays 
for any production costs related to discovery.
  
138 Thus, it is likely 
if there was a wholesale discovery exception to the SCA with no 
statutory requirement to cost-shift, the responding party would 
have to pay for the service provider’s production expenses.139
 
 133. Id. at 598. 
 
There are some procedures that would allow the responding 
party to cost-shift for the production of electronically stored in-
 134. Id. 
 135. Subrin, supra note 95, at 697. But see Mazza, supra note 100, at 98 
(“[D]ecisions on motions regarding who will be required to pay for discovery 
responses (the cost of which may run into the hundreds of thousands, if not 
tens of millions, of dollars) can impact severely how an action proceeds and in 
fact may be outcome-determinative in some cases.”). 
 136. See Zwillinger & Genetski, supra note 56, passim. 
 137. See supra notes 104–16 and accompanying text. 
 138. See Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 358 (1978) 
(“[T]he presumption is that the responding party must bear the expense of 
complying with discovery requests . . . .”). 
 139. See id. But see FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(B) (providing that parties need 
not produce electronic information that would result in “undue burden or 
cost”). 
Vandelist_MLR  
2014] STATUS UPDATE 1557 
 
formation that is “not reasonably accessible because of undue 
burden or cost,” though the specifics of cost-shifting rules are 
jurisdiction-specific and constantly in flux, and it is unclear if 
such information would qualify under these standards.140 Con-
sequently, if there were a civil discovery exception that didn’t 
require cost-shifting, requesting parties would likely always re-
quest information directly from the social networking site be-
cause they have an incentive to gather complete information 
and no economic disincentive.141
 
 This proposed modification 
would allow complete discovery of electronic information only 
when a requesting party believes the information likely to be 
produced outweighs the cost. This will necessarily reduce un-
necessary litigation costs.  
*  *  * 
 
While none of the proposals above strike the right equilib-
rium between justice and efficiency, there are features of each 
proposal that can be incorporated into a balanced solution to 
amend the SCA. Any amendment to the SCA should attempt to 
create a uniform approach to requesting electronically stored 
information in civil discovery. Further, broadening the category 
of information covered by the SCA will reduce current confu-
sion as to what information is covered and help ensure the leg-
islation is not rendered obsolete through future changes in 
technology. Finally, providing a cost-shifting provision for in-
formation that is difficult to reach would strike the right bal-
ance between justice and efficiency. 
III. A BALANCED PROPOSAL TO AMEND THE SCA  
As evidenced by the problems with the status quo, the SCA 
needs to be amended in order to provide consistent application 
across current and future technologies. In order to render SCA 
protection in civil discovery explicit and not merely implied, 
legislators should amend the SCA to contain a civil discovery 
provision that incorporates three features. First, this provision 
 
 140. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(B); see also Mazza, supra note 100, at 99 
(“[T]he law on shifting the cost of producing ESI remains jurisdiction-specific, 
often unsettled, sometimes conflicting, and continually evolving.”). 
 141. For example, in disparate treatment cases often plaintiffs must find 
evidence of a “smoking gun” in order to prove liability, which incentivizes 
plaintiffs to obtain as much information as possible. See Marcus, supra note 
88, at 749–50. 
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ought to include a broad definition of protected information in 
order to reduce judicial and economic inefficiencies. Second, the 
amendment should retain and codify the user exception. Third, 
the amendment should allow for information rendered inacces-
sible by the SCA to be discovered through the service provider 
if the requesting party pays the responding party’s costs. Such 
an amendment would satisfy both the interests of justice and 
efficiency. 
A. BROADEN THE DEFINITION OF PROTECTED INFORMATION 
Enlarging the scope of SCA protection through a broader 
definition of protected information will increase efficiency in 
the discovery of information stored online. The current ECS 
and RCS definitions are obsolete and result in judicial and eco-
nomic inefficiencies.142 The problem with the current definitions 
is that they were written to reflect the technological landscape 
of the day and not drawn broadly to adapt to new technolo-
gies.143 The proposal to collapse the ECS and RCS is limited by 
the fact that it merely transfers the outmoded definitions to 
files.144
The categories of ECS and RCS providers should be aban-
doned in favor of a single network service provider category.
 To avoid this pitfall, a broad catchall definition should 
be drafted for electronic information stored on the Internet.  
145
This definition of a network service provider is admittedly 
broad and somewhat vague. However, this is by design. A broad 
definition of what is covered will allow the SCA’s new civil dis-
covery provision to adapt to the changing technological tides 
 
Under the SCA, the definition of a “network service provider” 
should be broad enough to encompass all present and future 
technologies that transmit information over the Internet. The 
statutory definition of a “network service provider” should be 
any Internet service provider that provides services to users. 
There should also be a note of statutory interpretation in the 
statute that makes clear that this definition is to be broadly 
construed. The broad definition coupled with this note of statu-
tory interpretation will encompass all present and foreseeable 
future Internet service providers. 
 
 142. See supra notes 113–30 and accompanying text.  
 143. See supra notes 18–23, 51, 112 and accompanying text. 
 144. See supra Part II.B. 
 145. This is the same approach advocated for by Orin Kerr and Rudolph 
Burshnic. See Kerr, supra note 15, at 1235; Burshnic, supra note 9, at 1288–
89. 
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and will avoid the current problem of fitting new technologies 
into old definitions. Also, the definition should not include a list 
of examples as to what is covered because then the statute 
would fall prey to the doctrine of noscitur a sociis.146 This canon 
of construction interprets a general word to be read in accord-
ance with the specific terms listed in a series.147
Cloud computing provides an illustrative example of how 
this new definition would work. If a user, Joe Briefcase,
 Thus, the prac-
tical effect of including a list of electronic communications cov-
ered by the civil discovery amendment would be to lock the 
definition into the technologies of today instead of allowing it to 
adapt to the technologies of tomorrow. 
148
In addition to broadening the definition of what service 
providers are covered, the new statute should abolish the cur-
rent statute’s heightened protection for service providers that 
offer their services to the public.
 per-
formed most of his computing in an Internet cloud provided by 
Microsoft (e.g., word processing, spreadsheets, email communi-
cations) Microsoft would be completely covered by the new def-
inition of “network service provider” because it is providing 
services to Joe Briefcase. This is true even if Joe stores some of 
this information on his computer’s hard drive because the 
manner in which Joe stores his information does not change 
the fact that Microsoft is providing him Internet services. Also, 
this is a moot point due to the user exception to be discussed 
below. If Joe stores his information locally on his computer, dis-
covery can be requested through him and not Microsoft.  
149 There is no legislative histo-
ry in support of this distinction150
 
 146. See Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561, 575 (1995) (“[A] word is 
known by the company it keeps (the doctrine of noscitur a sociis).”); Beecham 
v. United States, 511 U.S. 368, 371 (1994) (“That several items in a list share 
an attribute counsels in favor of interpreting the other items as possessing 
that attribute as well.”). 
 and the two proffered reasons 
for the distinction by commentators no longer accord with reali-
 147. Gustafson, 513 U.S. at 575; Beecham, 511 U.S. at 371. 
 148. Joe Briefcase is a fictional character created by David Foster Wallace 
in his essay E Unibus Pluram: Television and U.S. Fiction that appears in A 
SUPPOSEDLY FUN THING I’LL NEVER DO AGAIN 39 (1997). 
 149. See 18 U.S.C. § 2702(a)(1)–(3) (2006) (prohibiting ECS and RCS enti-
ties serving “the public” from disclosing any person’s communications to any 
person, entity, or government). 
 150. Kerr, supra note 15, at 1226 (explaining that the legislative history is 
not clear about why only ECS and RCS providers that offer services to the 
public are covered). 
  
1560 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [98:1536 
 
ty.151 One of the reasons offered for the distinction is that non-
public providers of services, like a university email system, are 
for the benefit of the provider—the university—and not the us-
er and, therefore, the user’s information should not be protect-
ed.152 However, it cannot be said that public accounts are only 
for the benefit of the user because Internet service providers to 
the public are for profit entities that see the users as benefiting 
the provider.153 A second reason presented for the current dis-
tinction between public and private is that nonpublic providers 
have more of an incentive to not disclose their user’s infor-
mation because they have a “long-term, multifaceted relation-
ship with their users” whereas public providers only see users 
as a source of revenue.154 However, this is a distinction without 
a difference because in civil discovery a third party’s incentive 
to protect user’s privacy does not matter; the only thing that 
matters is the legal tools available to protect that privacy. Fur-
ther, service providers that offer services to the public have just 
as much of an incentive to protect privacy because privacy 
breaches have a negative impact on a company’s bottom line.155
Some might also argue that this new definition is overly 
broad and places too much emphasis on efficiency. After all, 
this definition applies to limit third party discovery requests 
from all present and future Internet service providers. Accord-
ingly, the new statute could protect highly relevant material 
simply because it is stored online. However, as noted below, 
there still remains a user exception and a cost-shifting option to 
obtain information stored with these service providers.  
 
Therefore with this new definition, judges, lawyers, and 
service providers would no longer have to fit the square peg of 
current and new technologies into the round ECS and RCS 
holes, thereby increasing efficiency of the entire discovery pro-
cess. 
 
 151. For an explanation of these two rationales, see id. at 1226–27. 
 152. Id.  
 153. E.g., Robison, supra note 18, at 1213–14 (describing how cloud compu-
ting companies use contextual advertising to drive revenues). 
 154. Kerr, supra note 15, at 1227. 
 155. See Alessandro Acquisti, et al., Is There a Cost to Privacy Breaches? 
An Event Study, Workshop on the Economics of Information Security 1, 12 
(2006), available at http://www.heinz.cmu.edu/~acquisti/papers/acquisti 
-friedman-telang-privacy-breaches.pdf (finding a statistically significant nega-
tive relationship between privacy breaches and a company’s market value).  
Vandelist_MLR  
2014] STATUS UPDATE 1561 
 
B. RETAIN THE USER EXCEPTION TO THE SCA 
Retaining the user exception to the SCA will strike the cor-
rect balance between efficiency and liberal discovery. Serving 
civil discovery requests on the user instead of the provider is 
the “easiest and most efficient way to conduct” discovery of 
electronically stored information.156 This is because a user is 
more familiar with where responsive information is available 
than the service provider,157 service providers would incur third 
party legal fees if subpoenas were granted,158 and it is drastical-
ly more expensive for a provider to preserve all possible rele-
vant information for all of its users’ ongoing civil litigation than 
for a user to preserve such information.159 Additionally, retain-
ing the user exception to the SCA allows for full and liberal dis-
covery. All information that a user has legal access to can be 
discovered through a rule thirty-four request directly on the 
user.160
The user exception to the SCA should be codified in the civ-
il discovery amendment in order to make it explicit to the 
courts and litigants that this is the most reasonably accessible 
tool for discovering electronically stored information. The stat-
utory language should read: “This statute does not apply to le-
gally valid civil discovery requests served upon an Internet ser-
vice provider’s user.” Although many courts have noted that 
this exception is inherent in the statute,
  
161 some litigants do not 
use it and other courts have not recognized it.162
 
 156. Megan Uncel, Note, “Facebook Is Now Friends with the Court”: Cur-
rent Federal Rules and Social Media Evidence, 52 JURIMETRICS J. 43, 58 
(2011). For an example of the costs of such third party subpoenas, see supra 
note 
 Therefore, in 
116 and accompanying text. 
 157. Cf. Mazza, supra note 100, at 19 (“The ‘cost and time required to have 
legal professionals read documents closely’ for responsiveness, privilege, and 
other confidentiality concerns, especially ‘in the context of cases involving 
hundreds of thousands (or even millions) of pages of records, can be astronom-
ical.’”) (internal citations omitted). 
 158. See id.; supra note 116 and accompanying text. 
 159. See Mazza, supra note 100, at 30 (“Once the scope of a litigation hold 
has been determined, it is up to a party and its counsel to take reasonable 
steps to see that sources of information within the scope are located and actu-
ally placed on hold during implementation.”). 
 160. See Uncel, supra note 156, at 58 (“Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 34 
grants parties the opportunity to discover evidence that is within the respond-
ing party’s ‘possession, custody, or control.’”). Any information a user can ac-
cess from her account is discoverable through this rule. Id. 
 161. See supra note 86 and accompanying text. 
 162. For examples of court decisions not discussing the user exception but 
applying the SCA to protect information stored on the Internet, see United 
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order to increase efficiency, the user exception should be codi-
fied to give clear guidance to courts and litigants. 
It could be argued that retaining only the user exception to 
the SCA and not providing any discovery through the provider 
possibly eliminates much discoverable information.163 There is a 
risk of spoliation whereby a user could delete any responsive 
information once litigation commences.164 However, this risk 
can be sufficiently reduced by supplementing discovery re-
quests with document protection orders and through the Model 
Rules of Professional Conduct, which suggest that it is unethi-
cal for a lawyer to assist or counsel in the “destruction, altera-
tion, or concealment of evidence that is relevant to a legal pro-
ceeding” or in foreseeable litigation.165 This approach does leave 
open the possibility that a shrewd client might destroy im-
portant information without the lawyer’s counsel.166
C. PROVIDE A COST-SHIFTING CIVIL DISCOVERY EXCEPTION 
 This nar-
row loophole can be closed through the cost-shifting discovery 
mechanism discussed below.  
Providing a cost-shifting mechanism that would allow liti-
gants to obtain information otherwise unavailable is in the best 
interests of justice. As noted above, the Zwillinger and Genetski 
procedure for obtaining this information is a good model for 
how to add a cost-shifting discovery exception. This proposal 
would allow a civil litigant to obtain information from an Inter-
net service provider if that litigant showed the information was 
relevant and unavailable from other sources, if that litigant 
paid for the other party’s costs, and if it did not result in undue 
burden or cost upon the service provider.167
 
States v. Councilman, 418 F.3d 67 (1st Cir. 2005); Theofel v. Farey-Jones, 359 
F.3d 1066 (9th Cir. 2004); Bower v. Bower, 808 F. Supp. 2d 348 (D. Mass. 
2011); Crispin v. Christian Audigier, Inc., 717 F. Supp. 2d 965 (C.D. Cal. 
2010); Viacom Int’l Inc. v. Youtube Inc., 253 F.R.D. 256 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). 
 Though, there 
should be one addition to Zwillinger and Genetski’s amend-
 163. See, e.g., Ward, supra note 8, at 564 (noting that users often do not 
have access to their deleted data). 
 164. See Uncel, supra note 156, at 53 (“For example, in the context of social 
media evidence, spoliation issues often go hand in hand with party requests. 
There is a legitimate risk ‘that the witness will erase all the comments from 
his [social networking profile] immediately upon receiving’ the request.”) (in-
ternal citations omitted). 
 165. Id. at 57–58 (internal citations omitted). 
 166. See id. at 58 (“A stealthy client thus could delete his social media pro-
file without legal penalty.”). 
 167. See supra notes 126–28 and accompanying text.  
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ment. The responding party should have to pay for the costs of 
producing any information that was deleted, altered, or con-
cealed after the time when litigation was filed, threatened, or 
reasonably foreseeable.168 There should be a safe harbor excep-
tion for information that is lost by the service provider as a re-
sult of the “routine, good-faith operation of an electronic infor-
mation system.”169
This would provide an added disincentive for spoliation 
and provide equity in cost shifting. In addition to the current 
sanctions for failing to preserve evidence,
  
170
Some might argue that this fails to meet the rule one re-
quirement of being “just” because cost-shifting can sometimes 
be cost-prohibitive and therefore dispositive.
 a party that inten-
tionally spoils evidence would have to pay for the costs of re-
storing that evidence. This is in accordance with fundamental 
notions of equity as well because a party that spoils evidence 
should not benefit by shifting the cost of producing that evi-
dence onto the other party. 
171 However, dis-
positive cost-shifting usually only occurs when there are large-
scale requests for terabytes of information costing millions of 
dollars.172 Although the use of online communications is in-
creasing,173 it is not likely to be the case that these requests will 
result in prohibitively large amounts of data.174
 
 168. Accord AM. BAR ASS’N, SPOLIATION OF EVIDENCE 5 (Daniel F. Gourash 
et al. eds., 2d ed. 2006) (“Generally, no duty to preserve evidence arises before 
litigation is filed, threatened, or reasonably foreseeable . . . .”). 
  
 169. FED. R. CIV. P. 37(e). 
 170. See generally AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 168, at 54–78 (describing a 
district court’s broad discretionary authority to impose sanctions including an 
adverse inference, default judgment, or fines and penalties). 
 171. See Mazza, supra note 100, at 98 (“[D]ecisions on motions regarding 
who will be required to pay for discovery responses (the cost of which may run 
into the hundreds of thousands, if not tens of millions, of dollars) can impact 
severely how an action proceeds and in fact may be outcome-determinative in 
some cases.”). 
 172. See id. 
 173. See supra notes 1–5 and accompanying text.  
 174. For example, as of 2012 Gmail only allows users to store 10 GB of da-
ta, Picasa allows users to store 1 GB of pictures and videos, and AOL allows 
the preservation of 9,000 emails. Free Storage Limits, GOOGLE, http://support 
.google.com/picasa/bin/answer.py?hl=en&answer=1224181 (last visited Mar. 
10, 2014); Message: My Mailbox Is Full, AOL, http://help.aol.com/help/ 
microsites/microsite.do?cmd=displayKC&docType=kc&externalId=220725 
(last visited Mar. 10, 2014); Your Storage Limit, GOOGLE GMAIL, http://support 
.google.com/mail/bin/answer.py?hl=en&answer=6558 (last visited Mar. 10, 
2014). 
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 CONCLUSION  
The SCA has outlived its usefulness in the area of civil dis-
covery. The current application of the SCA creates inconsistent 
protection, inefficiency in civil discovery, and limits the amount 
of discoverable information. In order to strike the right balance 
between efficiency and justice, legislators should add a civil 
discovery amendment to the SCA that broadens the definition 
of protected information, codifies the user exception, and allows 
for a cost-shifting discovery provision.  
 
